United Nations A/C.5/64/SR.24

General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session

Official Records

Distr.: General
1 April 2010

Original: English

Fifth Committee

Summary record of the 24th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 2 March 2010, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Maurer ..... (Switzerland)
Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions: Ms. McLurg

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Agenda item 132: Programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011 (*continued*)

Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

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10-25499 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Agenda item 132: Programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011 (*continued*)

Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council (A/64/7/Add.21 and A/64/349/Add.6)

1. **Mr. Yamazaki** (Controller) said that the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2010 (A/64/349/Add.6) presented proposed additional resource requirements, amounting to $1,044,000 net, for three special political missions: the United Nations Representative on the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, and the Monitoring Group on Somalia.

2. He recalled that the Security Council, in its resolution 1905 (2009), had extended the mandate of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq until 31 December 2010. The associated resource requirements, which would cover the cost of official travel of the Secretary-General's representative on the Board to four meetings of that body and the hosting of one meeting in New York, amounted to $82,200.

3. The Office of the Ombudsperson to assist the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities when considering delisting requests, which would be established for an initial period of 18 months in accordance with the decision of the Security Council in paragraph 20 of its resolution 1904 (2009), was intended to be supported by the existing resources of the Department of Political Affairs. Accordingly, additional requirements for 2010 would be limited to the Ombudsperson's fees and related expenses, estimated at $192,800.

4. By its resolution 1907 (2009), the Security Council had extended the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia to encompass new measures against Eritrea. In paragraph 19 of that resolution, the Council had requested the Secretary-General to make appropriate arrangements for additional resources and personnel. The estimated additional requirements for 2010, amounting to $769,000, would cover costs including the fees and travel expenses of three additional experts for nine months, and one additional local-level position to provide research and administrative support to the Monitoring Group.

5. The General Assembly was invited to approve the additional requirements for 2010 of $1,044,000 net, and to approve a charge of the same amount against the balance of the provision for special political missions under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011.

6. **Mr. Siqueira** (Department of Political Affairs) said that he wished to clarify on behalf of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs the details provided in paragraph 16 of the report of the Secretary-General. The Department of Political Affairs had initially concluded that the Monitoring Group on Somalia should be relocated temporarily for security reasons. However, the security situation was kept under constant review, and the Department of Political Affairs currently planned for the Monitoring Group to continue to operate from Nairobi during 2010.

7. Should security conditions so require, the members of the Monitoring Group might have to be based for a period of time in New York or at their own homes. The Department of Safety and Security would continue to monitor the situation closely and provide the Department of Political Affairs with up-to-date advice. The Department of Political Affairs took the view that it must balance the need to fulfil the sensitive and complex mandate of the Monitoring Group with the need to ensure adequate security and protection for the staff and consultants involved.

8. **Ms. McLurg** (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) said that the Advisory Committee, in its report on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2010 (A/64/7/Add.21), had made comments and recommendations regarding the three special political missions concerned. It invited the General Assembly to

approve the associated additional requirements, amounting to $1,044,000 net, and to approve a charge of the same amount against the balance of the provision for special political missions approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/245 for the biennium 2010-2011. However, the clarification provided by the Department of Political Affairs regarding the prospective relocation of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, which held cost implications, would require the Advisory Committee to amend the recommendations contained in its report.

9. **Mr. Sugiyama** (Japan) said that his delegation had noted the increasing share of the programme budget devoted to special political missions and had therefore repeatedly encouraged the Secretary-General to propose for those missions budgets that were no larger than strictly necessary to comply with the mandates conferred on them by the Security Council. The revised estimates should meet the same criteria.

10. Noting that the monitoring of sanctions relating to Eritrea was being entrusted to the existing Monitoring Group on Somalia rather than to a new group, he welcomed the awareness of the need for budgetary discipline demonstrated by the Security Council and the Secretary-General. He also noted the intention to support the Office of the Ombudsperson assisting the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) from within the existing resources of the Department of Political Affairs. Should the use of the same mechanism to assist with delisting requests be proposed in connection with other sanctions regimes, the Office of the Ombudsperson established under Security Council resolution 1904 (2009) should have the mandate to provide such assistance, in order to avoid institutional overlap.

The meeting rose at 10.25 a.m.

United Nations A/C.5/64/SR.25

General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session

Official Records

Distr.: General
1 April 2010

Original: English

Fifth Committee

Summary record of the 25th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 5 March 2010, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Maurer ..... (Switzerland)
later: Mr. Sene (Vice-Chairman) ..... (Senegal)
Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions: Ms. McLurg

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Agenda item 130: Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations (*continued*)

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10-26019 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Agenda item 130: Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations (*continued*) (A/64/587, A/64/640 and A/64/683 and Corr.1)

1. **Ms. Kane** (Under-Secretary-General for Management), introducing the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Towards an accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat" (A/64/640), said that the document was in response to General Assembly resolution 63/276. It proposed a definition of accountability that drew on the definitions used by other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, the World Bank and other bodies, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Union. The definition had been reviewed at over 15 consultation meetings held to discuss the draft report. The Secretariat would, of course, listen to any amendments that Member States might propose.

2. The basic principles of accountability were enshrined in the Charter, and the report recognized the importance of the Organization's planning and reporting documents — the strategic framework, programme budget, peacekeeping budgets and performance reports — for effective accountability.

3. A number of immediate actions were proposed to address weaknesses in the current accountability system. The first, which would require the Assembly's approval, would be to issue an annual programme performance report to address the problem of the availability and timing of information on performance provided to Member States. The role of the Management Committee should be expanded to ensure implementation of the recommendations of oversight bodies. The objectives in senior managers' compacts should be better integrated with the Organization's overall objectives through simultaneous review of the programme performance report and senior managers' compacts by the Management Performance Board. Moreover, there should be a mechanism to relate decisions under the new system of administration of justice to the performance assessments of managers and staff at all levels. With respect to delegation of authority, the responsibilities of all involved should be clarified and the mechanisms for effective and efficient delegation of authority in administrative areas should be streamlined, while an interdepartmental effort should be undertaken to review and update the other types of delegation of authority in the Secretariat: substantive, institutional and by designation.

4. Three other lines of action were also proposed. Firstly, reform of the performance appraisal system and the issue of self-evaluation and lessons learned would be the subject of separate reports to the Assembly pursuant to its resolutions 63/250 and 63/311, respectively. Secondly, the effective implementation of results-based management and an enterprise risk management and internal control framework would require the establishment of dedicated capacities. Thirdly, the implementation of the Umoja enterprise resource planning project currently under way would establish an effective reporting system that would make a transparent link between resources used and results achieved.

5. All stakeholders must discharge their assigned roles: Member States must provide clear and concise mandates and resources commensurate with those mandates; the Secretariat must respond to those mandates through its actions and results.

6. The recommendations set out in the report included requests to the Assembly to endorse the preparation of an interim programme performance report and to continue supporting the implementation of Umoja and the work of the oversight bodies and Management Committee. Some related to the establishment of a Results Management Unit, an enterprise risk management and internal control framework and a dedicated capacity for enterprise risk management in the Secretariat. A final recommendation requested the Assembly to endorse the components of the accountability system described in the report and the measures proposed to strengthen accountability.

7. Accountability was a dynamic concept, which explained why the word "towards" had been used in the document's title. What was acceptable now might not be acceptable in the future. The systems and tools used to ensure accountability in the Organization's operations must evolve and undergo continuous review, an ongoing process that would require the collective efforts of all those involved.

8. The fundamental elements of the United Nations accountability system set out in annex I comprised six interrelated components: the Charter; the covenant with Member States, which included the strategic framework, programme budget and peacekeeping

budgets; delivering results and performance, including a system of rewards and sanctions; internal systems and control; ethical standards and integrity; and oversight roles and functions.

9. Annex II contained a proposal for an enterprise risk management and internal control framework that included a methodology for assessing and managing risks, a dedicated capacity and a road map for the implementation of such a framework in the Secretariat.

10. With respect to methodology, the main components of the risk management process were the internal environment; the consideration of risks and objectives, beginning with a mapping of risks that aligned the two; event identification and risk assessment, which included identifying potential events that might entail risks for the Organization; risk response and control activities, including the prioritization of risks based on their impact and likelihood; information and communication; and monitoring, which would be the responsibility of management.

11. There were two particularly important methodological aspects. Firstly, in addition to the concept of inherent risk, the Secretariat would be working with the concept of residual risk, which took into consideration the exposure to inherent risk and the effectiveness of controls in place to mitigate identified risks. Secondly, while the day-to-day management of risks and controls would be the responsibility of all managers and staff, overall responsibility for the implementation of an effective enterprise risk management and internal control framework in the Secretariat would ultimately rest with the most senior level of management.

12. Annex III set out the most important measures undertaken to avoid a recurrence of what had happened in the oil-for-food programme. The Independent Inquiry Committee had identified several weaknesses in the administration of the programme that were within the purview of the Secretariat. Inadequate internal audit coverage was being addressed through risk assessment exercises in the context of the work programme of the Office of Internal Oversight Services and through coordination between that Office and other oversight bodies. The poor implementation of audit recommendations had resulted in the establishment of the Management Committee to oversee that process. The absence of an independent audit committee had been rectified through the establishment of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee by General Assembly resolution 60/248.

13. To address conflicts of interest, the Ethics Office had been established and had elaborated policies on potential conflicts of interest, financial disclosure and whistle-blower protection. The enterprise risk management framework proposed in the current report would identify high-risk areas and develop mitigation strategies, while the proposed composition of the accountability system would also help to correct weak internal controls. A robust results-based management framework would address inadequate monitoring of programme implementation. As part of procurement reform, the Secretary-General had introduced measures to strengthen internal control and promote ethics, integrity, fairness and transparency in the procurement process, including a mechanism to review challenges to procurement awards.

14. Lastly, the Secretariat would continue to exercise close oversight over the approval of exceptions to standards of accommodation for air travel in order to minimize costs to the Organization.

15. **Ms. McLurg** (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions), introducing the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/64/683 and Corr.1), said that the Advisory Committee was of the view that the Secretary-General's report (A/64/640) provided a good basis for moving towards a credible accountability system. Chapter II of the Advisory Committee's report addressed each of the requests made by the General Assembly in its resolution 63/276 and the conclusions were set out in chapter III.

16. While the Advisory Committee did not recommend the establishment of an Enterprise Risk Management and Control Section or a Results Management Unit, it had no objection to a dedicated focus to develop standards, policies and methods and to support managers in the area of risk management and ensure the effective implementation of results-based management.

17. An accountability framework could not, in and of itself, establish a culture of accountability. Such a culture required a change in the mindset of the staff, driven by a sustained commitment at the most senior levels of the Secretariat. Furthermore, a strong

underlying framework was indispensable to ensure that the various components of an accountability system would interact successfully and to provide assurances to Member States that personal and institutional accountability were embedded in the organizational culture.

18. The Advisory Committee could not recommend that the General Assembly should endorse the elements of accountability set out in annex I to the Secretary-General's report as they were not fully developed. Areas that required further attention were highlighted throughout its report.

19. **Ms. Ahlenius** (Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services), introducing the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the review of the practice of the Secretariat regarding the sharing of information contained in reports of consultants on management-related issues (A/64/587), said that the review had revealed that consultants' reports were not widely shared within departments. Some 52 per cent of survey respondents had indicated that they did not store consultants' reports in a central location where they could be accessed by staff members outside the division or service that had commissioned the consultancy. Conversely, 78 per cent of respondents had said that they shared such reports with other departments and offices to which they felt the reports would be relevant. However, they did not apply any established criteria in making that determination or when acting on requests for access to consultants' reports.

20. Departments and offices generally expressed reservations about sharing consultants' reports with legislative bodies or Member States, especially in cases where they had not accepted the consultants' recommendations; when they thought that the consultant had not applied sufficiently rigorous methodologies; when they thought that the subject matter was of no relevance to those bodies; or when they thought that it would be inappropriate to do so because the report provided input for policy decisions that would also be based on other considerations. Some departments and offices were concerned that consultants might not provide entirely candid advice or assessments if they were aware that their reports would be made widely available, thus limiting the value of their reports to management. One office had indicated that a report would have to be redrafted or given additional context before being shared, to prevent misunderstanding.

21. Consultants' reports were advisory in nature; making them available to legislative bodies might inaccurately impute to them the status of accepted guidance or a standard that the Secretariat must adopt. Sharing such reports might also dilute management accountability for policy proposals. However, when the Secretariat used consultants' reports as inputs for reports to legislative bodies, the related report of the Secretary-General should indicate that fact and, at a minimum, should explain the background of the consultancies and how the information had been used. The Office recommended that the modalities for sharing information in consultants' reports being developed by the Secretary-General should include that requirement.

22. The Office further recommended that, in applying guidelines on the classification and secure handling of confidential information, heads of departments and offices should develop criteria for the categorization of information according to its sensitivity. It also recommended that a taxonomy should be developed to organize consultants' reports and facilitate their retrieval and that a platform should be developed to serve as a central repository of all consultants' reports within the Secretariat. She was pleased to note that all of the recommendations had been accepted.

23. Access to consultancy reports was a special case within the broader issue of access to information, which had been addressed in a previous report of the Secretary-General (A/60/846/Add.4). A policy on access to information would be in line with many national and international "right to know" practices. The United Nations was a publicly financed organization that was accountable to its funders and stakeholders. Transparency would help develop the culture of accountability that the General Assembly wished to establish.

24. **Mr. Al-Shahari** (Yemen), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, reaffirmed the need to strengthen accountability at the United Nations. It was far from ideal, in that connection, that the late issuance of the Secretary-General's report had in turn led to the issuance of the Advisory Committee's report only two days before its introduction. It was also surprising, since the Secretary-General had been well aware of when the item would be taken up.

25. The Secretary-General's report (A/64/640) fell short of expectations in that it did not respond to the specific issues set out in General Assembly resolution 63/276 or present an adequate accountability system for the United Nations. The Group was concerned, inter alia, about the manner in which the report had been prepared and the proposed definition of accountability. Moreover, the report failed to establish a fundamental link between the resolutions and decisions of intergovernmental bodies and the commitment of the Organization and staff to deliver on the mandates established therein. Instead, that commitment was made contingent on the availability of resources. Much of the blame for the failures of the oil-for-food programme, for example, had been attributed to a lack of resources for audits and oversight, while the issue of personal responsibility of staff members had been ignored. Nevertheless, the Group remained committed to the implementation of a comprehensive accountability system.

26. **Mr. Peralta-Momparler** (Spain), speaking on behalf of the European Union; the candidate countries Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia; and, in addition, Armenia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that the European Union considered it paramount to advance management reform and to have a results-oriented Organization that took into account and mitigated risks and held managers and staff accountable for the achievement of results. Drawing on the Advisory Committee's recommendations, it would engage in discussions of how the accountability system, results-based management, enterprise risk management and internal controls could be further developed and implemented.

27. **Mr. Ballantyne** (New Zealand), speaking also on behalf of Australia and Canada, said that the Secretary-General and his senior team should play a critical role in strengthening accountability and ensuring that the Organization's limited resources were being used effectively and for their intended purpose. He hoped that the Committee would build on the conceptual work done in the five years since the current process began and make tangible improvements in the Organization's accountability framework.

28. While the legal and regulatory framework to support personal and institutional accountability might be well developed, its rigorous application by senior leadership would always be critical to improving the Secretariat's performance. The Secretary-General's report (A/64/640) identified weaknesses in key areas such as performance reporting, applying a results-based approach and the administration of delegation of authority; he concurred with the Advisory Committee that possible solutions could have been more fully developed.

29. The three delegations would consider the proposal to supplement the biennial programme performance report with an interim progress report, but they were concerned that the performance report in its current form did not show how resources were used to achieve results. Any amendments to the reporting mechanism must include improvements to ensure that the performance report clearly reflected the Organization's true performance, so as to add value to both management and the oversight bodies.

30. He regretted that the proposed definition of accountability did not refer to efficiency, effectiveness or the role of the oversight bodies. There was merit in the Advisory Committee's observation that the definitions used by the International Civil Service Commission and the United Nations Population Fund provided a good basis for a definition of accountability for the United Nations Secretariat. He also welcomed its recommendation that benchmark 1 of the Joint Inspection Unit framework should be used as a starting point for the further implementation of results-based management.

31. **Mr. Coffi** (Côte d'Ivoire), speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, said that the Group was concerned by the late issuance of the Secretary-General's report, even though it had been known since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 63/276 in April 2009 that the report was to be submitted at the first part of the resumed sixty-fourth session.

32. Strengthening accountability in the United Nations was a priority because it directly affected the Secretariat's work and the relationship between Member States and the Secretariat. A comprehensive accountability framework would also yield benefits by promoting results-based management and budgeting. Regrettably, following three previous reports on accountability that had failed to meet Member States' expectations, the current report of the Secretary-General (A/64/640) did not adequately respond to the

requests set out in General Assembly resolution 63/276 and failed to propose an acceptable accountability system that could be implemented system-wide. Despite its concerns about the preparation of the report, the proposed definition of accountability and some other proposals, the Group would engage constructively in the informal consultations in order to achieve a comprehensive accountability system.

33. **Mr. Shin** Boonam (Republic of Korea) said that, despite some progress, the Secretariat had not shown much improvement in terms of accountability. The late submission of reports and the provision of insufficient information in some reports had become recurring problems that illustrated the Secretariat's lack of responsibility. Without a change in the mindset of staff, an accountability framework could not in itself create accountability and the proposed measures would have little effect. Yet great things started from small things: a small measure such as keeping to a schedule might not seem important but, along with other small measures, could have a great impact.

34. The current performance appraisal system should be reformed through the introduction of a mandatory distribution of performance ratings. Under the new system of contracts, staff at all levels who failed to meet performance criteria should be forced to leave the Organization, regardless of the type of contract they held. In addition, a significant portion of salaries should be redistributed to reflect differences in performance.

35. With regard to financial management, the current biennial programme budget seemed not to fully reflect the objectives set out in the strategic framework, while the budget system lacked a mechanism to allocate resources for the medium and long terms. The Secretariat should introduce a new fiscal management mechanism that closely linked the allocation of financial resources and the Organization's objectives.

36. Two considerations should inform the Committee's review of the current item: firstly, strengthened accountability should be accompanied by increased flexibility on the part of the Secretariat, since overemphasis on one element might hinder its efficiency and effectiveness; and, secondly, since they were requesting the Secretariat to assume a higher degree of accountability, Member States should serve as models and demonstrate a similarly high degree of responsibility.

37. **Mr. Melrose** (United States of America) said that the General Assembly must now move beyond its endorsement of the principles of results-based management and enterprise risk management in order to develop and implement frameworks that would further enhance accountability in the United Nations. For the Organization to carry out its vital work, it must have comprehensive risk management capabilities to assess, mitigate and address risks. The effectiveness of the United Nations depended on the full implementation of those ideas and frameworks. His delegation was concerned, that, as noted by the Advisory Committee, the key components that would improve accountability and mechanisms to measure performance and results had not been fully developed in the Secretary-General's report.

38. Member States must be given unbiased information on the effectiveness of United Nations activities, and resource decisions must be linked to programme effectiveness. The Secretary-General had noted that several key elements were missing, without which the results-based-budgeting framework could not function coherently and holistically. His delegation would support efforts to resolve those issues.

39. **Mr. Lim** Boon Hun (Singapore) said that, given the central role played by the Organization in world affairs, all of those involved had the responsibility to perform to the best of their ability. The Secretary-General's report (A/64/640) did not go far enough in addressing issues of concern to Member States. The definition of accountability proposed was far too limited. While the obligation to deliver specific results was one aspect of accountability, he was surprised that staff members' personal responsibility for their decisions and actions had not been mentioned. Greater efforts should be devoted to creating a culture of accountability and integrity in the United Nations. His delegation was concerned that the report did not adequately address the specific topics set out in General Assembly resolution 63/276 and felt that the consultations with oversight bodies could have been far more comprehensive.

40. His delegation was encouraged by the enlightened desire to make the Secretariat risk-aware rather than risk-averse, as that could lead to more creative responses to challenges. That must, however, be accompanied by a credible accountability framework under which, for instance, programme managers would be held to account for their use of

resources, personal conduct and ability to achieve results through their decisions and actions.

41. The Secretariat's explanation of steps taken to address the failure of the oil-for-food programme was inadequate. Four years had passed without a full account of the flaws in internal monitoring, inspection and accountability identified in the Volcker report. His delegation reiterated its call for a discussion by the General Assembly in an open setting.

42. *Mr. Sene (Senegal), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

43. **Mr. Sugiyama** (Japan) said that the key to ensuring accountability was a sincere effort by the Secretariat to administer itself properly under the existing framework. He shared the Secretary-General's view that the culture within the Secretariat must change so that staff understood that they would be accountable for the quality and timely delivery of their work and supervisors understood that they would be held accountable for effectively managing staff to that end.

44. His delegation shared the concerns expressed by others about the timely issuance of documents. It was also concerned about the lack of clarity on resource requirements. The Secretary-General's report (A/64/640) contained proposals to establish additional structures, but indicated that the associated resource requirements would be presented in due course. It was difficult for the Assembly to consider proposals without knowing their financial implications. His delegation reiterated its request to the Secretariat to avoid a piecemeal approach.

45. Noting with regret that the oversight bodies had been insufficiently consulted in the preparation of the report, he expressed appreciation to the Advisory Committee for consulting with those bodies and hoped to have an opportunity to interact with them during the Fifth Committee's deliberations.

46. Lastly, he welcomed the Secretariat's decision to resume the administration of the national competitive recruitment examination, which should be implemented speedily.

47. **Ms. Grünenfelder** (Switzerland) said that the Secretary-General had made a laudable effort to clarify the concept of accountability. While her delegation agreed with much of his analysis of the issue, the present report fell short of its expectations in several respects. Accountability should start with a willingness to assume responsibility for the outcome of professional actions and to abide by regulations, rules and the highest ethical standards. The Organization's senior leadership should demonstrate that willingness and strive to promote it among all staff. Little in the report reflected such determination to improve the system of accountability.

48. The Secretary-General's attempts to define and interrelate the various components of accountability were unconvincing. Rather than designing a complex accountability structure, her delegation saw merit in reducing the complexity and identifying more clearly delineated frameworks.

49. Progress in implementing results-based management and enterprise risk management should not be contingent on establishing new capacities. She wished to hear what specific steps the Secretary-General had taken in the preceding months to mainstream those crucial frameworks into the Organization under existing mandates.

50. She concurred with the Advisory Committee that implementing an enterprise resource planning system was important, but not sufficient, to resolve accountability issues. Lastly, the role of the oversight bodies in establishing effective accountability should have been reflected in the preparation of the report.

51. With respect to the sharing of information contained in consultants' reports on management-related issues, she welcomed the review by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (A/64/587), which would facilitate the Committee's efforts to define modalities to govern the Secretariat's future practice.

52. **Ms. Berlanga** (Mexico) said that implementing the recommendations of all United Nations monitoring, oversight, inspection and investigative bodies was an important part of establishing an accountability system to ensure transparency in the management of the Organization's resources. Her delegation's views on the Secretary-General's report were largely reflected in the report of the Advisory Committee (A/64/683). She was prepared to discuss alternatives to the proposed definition of accountability, a complex concept that would be crucial in defining a logical framework for accountability.

53. Her delegation had repeatedly stressed the importance of linking resource use to results and had

hoped for more clarity on and options for improving the programme performance report, which, together with delegated authority, was essential to scrutiny of expenditures. To achieve institutional accountability, it might be necessary to review regulation 6.1 of the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation.

54. The performance compacts for senior managers and performance appraisal system were inadequate in evaluating staff performance, which was crucial to accountability. The system of administration of justice was also important. The Secretary-General's report (A/64/640) failed to mention the consequences of unsatisfactory performance or inappropriate actions. Member States still knew nothing about the fate of financial resources lost through fraud or misappropriation or the outcome of actions undertaken by the Secretariat to recover them.

55. **Ms. Kane** (Under-Secretary-General for Management) said, in response to the statements by Member States, that she wished to clarify two points. Firstly, the internal oversight bodies had been consulted in the preparation of the Secretary-General's report (A/64/640). The Office of Internal Oversight Services had been part of the initial task force, but had withdrawn after two meetings out of concern that its operational independence was being hampered. It had acted in a consultative capacity thereafter, had participated in a workshop held in November 2009 to discuss the preliminary contents of the report, and had commented on the draft report. The Joint Inspection Unit had attended the workshop but had declined to comment on the draft report. The Board of Auditors had chosen not to participate in the workshop or to provide comments. The Independent Audit Advisory Committee had attended the workshop — indeed, its Chairman had served as a keynote speaker. That Committee had expressed willingness to consult on the report in its final version and had provided its views to the Advisory Committee.

56. Secondly, with respect to the definition of accountability, several definitions had been culled from organizations within the United Nations system, the World Bank and the European Commission. The definitions adopted by the United Nations Population Fund and the United Nations Development Programme reflected the outcome of an intergovernmental process. Accountability was a dynamic concept whose definition could be viewed in different ways. The Secretariat welcomed the comments by Member States and would amend the proposed definition with their assistance.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

United Nations A/C.5/64/SR.26

General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session

Official Records

Distr.: General
1 April 2010

Original: English

Fifth Committee

Summary record of the 26th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 10 March 2010, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Maurer ..... (Switzerland)
Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions: Ms. McLurg

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Agenda item 112: Appointments to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other appointments (*continued*)

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Conditions of service for the ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Revised estimates relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011 under sections 28C, 28D and 36 related to the Emergency Preparedness and Support Unit

Safety and security

Agenda item 142: Administration of justice at the United Nations (*continued*)

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10-26583 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Agenda item 112: Appointments to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other appointments (*continued*)

(a) Appointment of members of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (*continued*) (A/64/101/Add.1)

1. **The Chairman** drew attention to document A/64/101/Add.1, which indicated that Mr. Nagesh Singh (India) had resigned from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and that the Government of India had nominated Mr. Anupam Ray, whose candidacy had been endorsed by the Group of Asian States, to complete the unexpired portion of Mr. Singh's term of office. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to recommend the appointment of Mr. Ray to the Advisory Committee for a term of office beginning on the date of appointment and ending on 31 December 2010.

2. *It was so decided.*

3. *Mr. Ray was recommended for appointment to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for a term of office beginning on the date of his appointment and ending on 31 December 2010.*

Agenda item 132: Programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011 (*continued*)

Conditions of service for the ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (A/64/7/Add.20 and A/64/635 and Corr.1)

4. **Ms. Pollard** (Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management), introducing the report of the Secretary-General on conditions of service for the ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (A/64/635 and Corr.1), recalled that the Security Council, by its resolution 1329 (2000), had decided to establish a pool of ad litem judges in the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and to enlarge the membership of the Appeals Chambers of both Tribunals. The Council had further decided that those judges would serve in the Trial Chambers for one or more trials, for a cumulative period of up to, but not including, three years. In that connection, she noted that three years of uninterrupted service was the minimum term permanent judges were required to serve in order to be eligible for pension benefits.

5. In various resolutions, the Security Council had extended the term of office of the ad litem judges of both Tribunals beyond the maximum cumulative period of three years. As a result, a number of ad litem judges would have served more than three years continuously by the time the Tribunals had completed their work. Such an eventuality had been considered by the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session. At that time the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions had suggested that letters of appointment should stipulate that, notwithstanding such a development, the consequential extension of service would not give rise to any additional entitlements or benefits other than those which already existed and which would be extended pro rata by virtue of the extension of service (A/55/806). That principle was reiterated in Security Council resolution 1597 (2005), which stated that there would be no changes in the entitlements or benefits of ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with a cumulative period of service of three years or more.

6. In his 2001 and 2006 comprehensive reviews of the conditions of service and the pension benefits of the judges, the Secretary-General had shared the concern of the two Tribunals that the disparity between the pension benefits of the judges of the Tribunals and of the judges of the International Court of Justice had resulted in discrimination against the judges of the Tribunals.

7. At the sixty-third session, the General Assembly had decided that the pension scheme for the Tribunals' judges should remain a defined benefit and non-contributory scheme. Ad litem judges, however, had been excluded from that scheme. The Assembly had further decided that the emoluments, pensions, and other conditions of service of the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda would next be reviewed at its sixty-fifth session, including options for defined benefit and defined contribution pension schemes.

8. By the end of 2010, the majority of ad litem judges would have served for more than three years as a consequence of the policy of giving priority to

continuity in service of ad litem judges in order to achieve the goals of the completion strategies of the Tribunals. The Security Council, in its resolution 1878 (2009), had taken note of the concerns expressed about the terms and conditions of service of ad litem judges. However, it had not been able to take action because the matter was within the purview of the General Assembly.

9. Extending pension benefits to the ad litem judges would be consistent with the extension of their terms of service, as approved by the Security Council in its resolution 1877 (2009). Should the General Assembly decide to extend the pension scheme currently applicable to the permanent judges of the two Tribunals to the ad litem judges with more than three years of continuous service, the related budgetary implications were estimated at $421,300 for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and $346,566 for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, annually.

10. **Ms. McLurg** (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions), introducing the related report of the Advisory Committee (A/64/7/Add.20), said that, after considering the Secretary-General's report, the Advisory Committee had concluded that, given the differences in the conditions of service of the ad litem and permanent judges of the International Tribunals, it would be most appropriate to consider the matter of pension benefits for the ad litem judges in the context of the wider review of the emoluments, pensions and other conditions of service of the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the International Tribunals to be conducted by the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session.

11. The General Assembly should bear a number of issues in mind. The first was the question of eligibility as it related to length of service. In that connection, the Advisory Committee pointed out that the statutes of both Tribunals did not explicitly disqualify ad litem judges from receiving pension benefits. It was the limitation of service of ad litem judges to a cumulative period of less than three years that had prevented them from becoming eligible for pension benefits. However, since a number of ad litem judges of both Tribunals had now served for cumulative periods in excess of three years, those judges could be eligible for pension benefits, in accordance with the relevant pension scheme regulations.

12. However, it should be pointed out that, in implementation of an earlier recommendation of the Advisory Committee, subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly, all letters of appointment signed by ad litem judges at both Tribunals contained a proviso stipulating that, in the unlikely event that the service of an ad litem judge were to exceed three years, no additional entitlements or benefits, other than those which already existed, would apply.

13. Second, in determining whether the existing pension scheme for permanent judges should be extended to cover ad litem judges, the General Assembly might wish to consider whether, given the changed circumstances of the Tribunals' operations, the differences in the conditions of service of the two categories of judge continued to be justified.

14. Third, with regard to the Tribunals' completion strategies, the Advisory Committee had been informed that, if an ad litem judge were to leave the service of a Tribunal before the completion of the case to which he or she was assigned, a substitute judge could be appointed. Only one such substitution could be made during a hearing; the need for a second substitute would require the case to be reheard from the beginning. That might delay hearings and affect the ability of the Tribunals to complete their work on time. The report of the Secretary-General, however, contained no indication that, should the General Assembly retain the current terms and conditions of service, ad litem judges who had exceeded or would soon exceed the three-year period would resign before the completion of their cases.

15. **Mr. Al-Shahari** (Yemen), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that fairness, equality and justice should be the foundation of every aspect of the Organization's work. The Group therefore commended the Secretary-General for drawing attention to the unfair conditions of service of the ad litem judges.

16. Although the ad litem judges of both International Tribunals had been appointed on the understanding that their cumulative service would not exceed three years, thus making them ineligible for pension benefits, their terms of office had in fact been extended beyond that maximum cumulative period. As a result, some of those judges had served the minimum term permanent judges were required to serve in order to be eligible for pension benefits. The denial of

pension benefits to the ad litem judges was therefore a clear breach of the principles of equality, fairness and justice.

17. Eligibility for pension benefits was governed by the relevant pension scheme regulations. In its report, the Advisory Committee had indicated that, inasmuch as the statutes of both Tribunals did not explicitly disqualify ad litem judges from receiving pension benefits, those judges could be eligible for pension benefits.

18. Nearly three quarters of the ad litem judges of the two Tribunals would have completed three years' cumulative service by the end of 2010. The Group was therefore concerned that continued discrimination against those judges would have an adverse impact on the Tribunals' completion strategies. The differences in the conditions of service of the two categories of judge were no longer justified and should be addressed at the current part of the resumed sixty-fourth session.

19. The Group's position applied strictly to the conditions of service of the ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

20. **Mr. Coffi** (Côte d'Ivoire), speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, said that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had made every effort to conduct fair and expeditious trials while conforming to its completion strategy. However, despite those efforts, enormous challenges had made it impossible for the Tribunal to complete its work on time. The Group therefore welcomed Security Council resolution 1878 (2009), whereby the Council had extended the terms of office of some of the Tribunal's permanent and ad litem judges. The adoption of that resolution had enhanced the effectiveness of judicial proceedings and contributed towards the implementation of the completion strategy.

21. The Group noted that, by the end of 2010, the majority of the Tribunal's ad litem judges would have completed three years' cumulative service, which was the minimum term permanent judges were required to serve in order to be eligible for pension benefits. It further noted that the workload of the ad litem judges was identical to that of the permanent judges and that their responsibilities were nearly identical to those of the permanent judges. The Group therefore agreed that the continued differences in the terms and conditions of service between the permanent judges and ad litem judges were no longer justified and should be addressed in the interest of both equity and the successful implementation of the completion strategy.

22. Although the Group welcomed the General Assembly's decision to review the emoluments, pensions and other conditions of service of the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at its sixty-fifth session, it was imperative to address the issue of the conditions of service of the ad litem judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at the first part of the resumed sixty-fourth session.

Revised estimates relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011 under sections 28C, 28D and 36 related to the Emergency Preparedness and Support Unit (A/64/7/Add.22 and A/64/662)

23. **Ms. Pollard** (Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management), introducing the revised estimates relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011 under sections 28C, 28D and 36 related to the Emergency Preparedness and Support Unit (A/64/662), said that, as demonstrated by the disasters in Haiti, Kabul, Algiers and Baghdad, the increased risk to United Nations staff resulting from malicious acts, natural disasters and other emergencies required a proactive, comprehensive and coordinated ongoing support system for survivors of such incidents, as well as families affected by the injury or death of a loved one in the service of the United Nations.

24. An internal review had found that the Organization's capacity to respond to emergencies was limited and there was no consistent contact point to address the needs of affected persons. That was particularly true in the medium and long term. Staff members engaged in offering support were often untrained or inadequately equipped to navigate the complex administrative system they faced in meeting the needs of survivors and their families.

25. On the basis of that review and the lessons learned from major incidents over the past seven years, the Secretary-General proposed to establish a dedicated emergency preparedness and support unit in the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management in order to provide short-,

medium- and long-term support to survivors and the families of those who had perished or were injured as a result of a malicious act, natural disaster or other emergency.

26. The resource requirements for the proposed unit for the biennium 2010-2011 amounted to $3,145,100 gross ($2,941,300 net), and included the proposed establishment of eight new posts (1 D-1, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 P-3, 2 P-2 and 1 General Service (Other level)).

27. Although initial emergency response would remain the responsibility of the affected entity, the proposed unit would provide coordinated and complementary assistance in emergencies.

28. At present, approximately 10 cases related to the Baghdad bombing and approximately 20 cases related to the Algiers bombing were ongoing. With regard to the latter, the Organization was actively working to settle claims related to medical expenses and make determinations regarding, inter alia, permanent loss of function or disability and special sick leave credit. The Office of Human Resources Management lacked the capacity to address those cases and those of approximately 45 other staff members.

29. She anticipated that, as a result of the Haiti earthquake, the Advisory Board on Compensation Claims and the United Nations Claims Board would receive numerous requests to determine compensation under appendix D to the Staff Rules, which governed compensation in the event of death, injury or illness attributable to the performance of official duties. Such compensation would require monitoring and ongoing adjustment of the benefits paid. There would be cases in which support was required several weeks or months following a disaster or an emergency. The family members of individuals who had been kidnapped or taken hostage would also require assistance from the Organization.

30. Following the incidents in Baghdad and Algiers, the Organization had focused its attention on responding to the needs of the survivors and of their families. The Working Group on Staff Humanitarian Affairs had been re-established in order to consider how the United Nations could respond in a more caring and consistent way in the wake of malicious attacks against the Organization. The recommendations of the Working Group were reflected in the proposal before the Committee.

31. **Ms. McLurg** (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions), introducing the related report of the Advisory Committee (A/64/7/Add.22), said that communication and coordination on emergency preparedness, both within the Office of Human Resources Management and between that Office and other Secretariat entities, were of fundamental importance. The Advisory Committee was therefore concerned that the establishment of a separate structure would add another layer of bureaucracy. Consequently, the Advisory Committee recommended against the establishment of the proposed emergency preparedness and support unit.

32. Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee supported a limited strengthening of certain functions within the existing structure of the Office of Human Resources Management and had therefore recommended approval of a number of temporary posts pending the submission of a more elaborated proposal as part of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013. Any additional needs for the biennium 2010-2011 should be met from within existing capacity in the Office of Human Resources Management.

33. The Advisory Committee recognized the need to strengthen the Organization's ability to respond to the needs of victims and survivors; however, that should be based on a more systematic analysis of the existing capacities of the Secretariat that were engaged in related activities, such as disaster recovery, business continuity and critical incident stress management, and should include exploring and building on complementarities. In the light of that analysis, a careful assessment of the scope of activities should be undertaken. Greater attention should be given to cooperation and collaboration with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, including the possibility of cost-sharing arrangements, as well as to the utilization of voluntary support provided by Member States.

34. The Advisory Committee recommended the appropriation of an additional amount of $1,571,800 for the biennium 2010-2011, or a reduction of $1,573,300 in the Secretary-General's proposal. The amount of $1,571,800 would represent a charge against the contingency fund.

35. **Mr. Al-Shahari** (Yemen), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group

attached great importance to the well-being of all international civil servants and peacekeepers. United Nations staff had suffered enormous loss of life as a result of natural disasters and had become targets of increasing violence and malicious acts.

36. The Group agreed with the Secretary-General that the increased risk to United Nations staff demanded a proactive, comprehensive and coordinated ongoing support system for the survivors of such incidents and for their families. It was concerned that the Organization currently lacked a unique contact point to address the needs of survivors or affected families, and that the support provided was offered on an ad hoc basis and as an additional function by staff members who were engaged in other roles and responsibilities. With regard to the disaster in Haiti, the Group would seek further information on the Secretariat's interactions with affected families, as well as the special allowances and other measures taken to help United Nations staff and peacekeepers rest and recover after the earthquake.

37. The Group supported the establishment of the proposed emergency preparedness and support unit as the initial step in a more comprehensive effort and looked forward to learning of additional measures to enhance the Organization's capacity to assist staff members in emergencies or disasters, including the provision of long-term support to victims and their families. In that connection, the Medical Services Division should be strengthened as a matter of urgency.

38. Its support for the establishment of the proposed unit notwithstanding, the Group pointed out that the report could have included a more systematic analysis of the existing capacities of the Secretariat that were engaged in related activities. Greater attention should have been given to cooperation and collaboration with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes with a presence in the field.

39. **Mr. Hameed** (Pakistan) said his delegation was concerned by the increased risk to United Nations staff resulting from malicious acts, natural disasters and other emergencies. The loss of even one life demanded urgent action by the Committee. His delegation wished to honour United Nations staff members for their devoted service to the Organization, despite the threat to their personal safety, and to pay tribute to those who had sacrificed their lives for the sake of peace, including the more than 100 Pakistani peacekeepers who had died in the line of duty since the 1960s.

40. His delegation supported the establishment of the proposed emergency preparedness and support unit and looked forward to the Secretary-General's report on other requirements associated with provision of assistance and support to staff members, including assistance related to education for dependent children and travel for families of the deceased and survivors to memorial ceremonies and funerals and to places of evacuation.

41. Although his delegation, in principle, supported enhancing the emergency preparedness of the United Nations, the report should have included a more systematic analysis of the existing capacities of the Secretariat that were engaged in related activities, such as disaster recovery, business continuity and critical incident stress management.

Safety and security

42. **Mr. Yamazaki** (Controller) recalled that, in a letter dated 9 December 2009 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and subsequently transmitted to the Chairman of the Committee (A/C.5/64/10), the Secretary-General had indicated his intention to utilize $7,866,700 out of the budget for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to meet the most highly prioritized security requirements on an immediate basis for the period from 1 January to 30 April 2010.

43. The letter had also indicated that a formal, full and more stable funding proposal would be presented at the first part of the resumed sixty-fourth session, after an in-depth analysis of the United Nations position and security-related requirements in Afghanistan and other countries had been completed.

44. The Secretariat was not yet in a position to provide a detailed proposal for Afghanistan and other high-threat locations because there had not been sufficient time to examine the security enhancement options available. The Secretariat also needed to consult with agencies, funds and programmes on the proposals and to gain their agreement on the jointly financed funding portion where services or facilities were not funded by the regular budget.

45. The Secretariat intended to submit an analysis of security requirements for UNAMA to the General

Assembly at the second part of its resumed sixty-fourth session as part of the UNAMA progress report, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/245 on the recommendation of the Advisory Committee (A/64/7/Add.13). UNAMA was implementing the urgent and necessary security enhancements from its established budget for 2010. The Department of Safety and Security was working with agencies, funds and programmes in Afghanistan to ensure they were addressing their identifiable needs within their budgets.

46. With regard to other high-threat locations, the Secretariat intended to provide a proposal for security enhancements at the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly, including funding proposals with regard to cost-sharing with agencies, funds and programmes. The Department of Safety and Security would continue to fund urgent requirements for other high-threat locations from within its existing budget and liaise with agencies, funds and programmes with regard to funding the requirements for their staff and premises.

Agenda item 142: Administration of justice at the United Nations (*continued*) (A/C.5/64/16)

47. **Ms. McLurg** (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) said that, in a letter dated 8 February 2010 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly (A/64/664) and subsequently transmitted on 4 March 2010 to the Chairman of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/64/16), the Secretary-General had requested the General Assembly to consider extending by 12 months the terms of service of three ad litem judges of the United Nations Dispute Tribunal. After reviewing the Secretary-General's request, the Advisory Committee had no objection to extending the terms of service of those judges for the period deemed necessary but not longer than one year.

48. The Advisory Committee noted that, according to the Secretary-General, the resource requirements would be funded under the provisions of section III of General Assembly resolution 60/283, which had been extended until 30 April 2010 by the Assembly, under paragraph 142 of its resolution 64/243. It should be noted that the provisions of paragraph 142 of resolution 64/243 would expire prior to the commencement on 1 July 2010 of the extension of the three ad litem judges.

49. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee had been informed that the level of resource requirements for clearing the backlog of cases was estimated at $2,038,200 for the biennium 2010-2011. That figure included compensation for the three ad litem judges serving in Geneva, Nairobi and New York, as well as costs related to support staff for a period of one year, effective 1 July 2010.

50. The Advisory Committee noted from the Secretary-General's letter that the Secretariat would conduct a review of the new system of administration of justice and report to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session. The Advisory Committee's concurrence with the request for an extension should in no way prejudge the outcome of the upcoming review.

51. **Mr. Al-Shahari** (Yemen), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group was concerned that the Secretary-General had initially submitted his proposal to extend the terms of service of three ad litem judges of the United Nations Dispute Tribunal directly to the General Assembly. It was further concerned that action had been taken with the apparent intention of bypassing consideration of the issue by the Committee under the pretence that the resources required for the proposal could be allocated under the experimental arrangement whereby the Secretary-General was allowed to exercise limited budgetary discretion. In that connection, he noted that the Committee had yet to decide whether to extend that arrangement.

52. General Assembly resolution 63/253, which defined the duration of service of ad litem judges, had been adopted by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Committee. Any decision to extend the duration of service must therefore be approved by the Committee, regardless of how such an extension was financed. In that connection, the Group wished to reiterate that the Committee was the appropriate Main Committee of the General Assembly entrusted with responsibilities for administrative and budgetary matters. The Group was deeply concerned by the Secretary-General's attempt to use his limited budgetary discretion to fund activities that were not mandated by the General Assembly.

53. However, despite its concerns, the Group supported the reforms to the system of administration of justice at the United Nations, which had been approved by the General Assembly in its resolutions

61/261, 62/228 and 63/253. It looked forward to learning the results of the comprehensive review of the new system at the Assembly's sixty-fifth session.

54. The United Nations Dispute Tribunal should have the capacity to manage cases from the old system and new ones. Despite the unfortunate manner in which the Secretary-General's request had reached the Committee, the substance of that request had merit in view of the considerable workload of the Tribunal.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.